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WITNESS PROTECTIONS IN ILLINOIS CIVIL 
ACTIONS 
Jeffrey A. Parness* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the laws guiding witnesses at depositions, 
hearings, and trials in civil actions in Illinois circuit courts.  Such laws 
encompass norms for judicial limits ahead of any scheduled depositions or 
testimonies; for the taking of depositions and the presenting of testimonies 
once scheduled; and, for judicial sanctions arising from witness abuse 
during depositions, hearings, or trials.  The study includes a general review 
of other American trial court guidelines, especially comparing Illinois 
circuit court and federal district court practices. 
The article concludes Illinois lawmakers, in both the Supreme Court 
and in the General Assembly, have insufficiently protected civil case 
witnesses before, during, and after witness interrogations.  This lack of 
protection is especially evident upon viewing of the greater protections 
afforded by other American jurisdictions. 
Amendments to American civil practice guidelines, especially on 
formal discovery, are common.  New discovery laws should be considered 
in Illinois in order to protect witnesses better.1  The general federal civil 
procedure rule on discovery has been amended eight times since 1980.2  
The comparable Illinois rule has been revised five times since 1981.3   Yet 
                                                                                                                           
* Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois University College of Law.  Thanks to Russ Kazda for his 
research assistance and to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce for supporting some of the research 
leading to the article.  All analyses, errors, and omissions are mine alone. 
1.  Witness protections arise both from limits on those seeking discovery and from judicial controls 
over discovery initiatives.  The evolution of modern discovery methods and their controls is well-
explained in Paul M. Connolly, Edith A. Holleman and Michael J. Kuhlman, Judicial Controls 
and the Civil Litigation Process: Discovery (District Court Study Series, Federal Judicial Center, 
June, 1978) at 5-17. 
2.  Amendments to Federal Civil Procedure Rule (FRCP) 26 took effect in 1980, 1983, 1987, 1993, 
2000, 2006, 2007 and 2010 (though the 2007 amendments only restyled, and thus (allegedly) did 
not significantly alter practices).  Congress as well as the federal judicial rulemakers continue to 
discuss possible civil discovery reforms.  See, e.g., House Panel Looks at Discovery Costs, Urged 
to Defer to Judicial Rulemaking, 80 U.S.L.W. 827 (12-20-11) (most think federal judicial 
rulemaking rather than preemptive Congressional action is best, and many believe evidence 
preservation and sanctions for evidence spoliation require the attention of judicial rulemakers). 
3.  Amendments to Illinois Supreme Court Rule (ILLR) 201 took effect in 1981, 1982, 1989, 1995 
and 2002.  The significant changes that occurred in 1995 are described in Stephen F. Pflaum and 
Faustin A. Pipal, Jr., Successful Practice Under the New Illinois Civil Discovery Rules, 9 CBA 
Record 20 (Oct. 1995). 
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the major federal changes involving compelled disclosures, meet and confer 
demands, certification standards, more limited relevancy, and discovery 
plans have not been added in Illinois, leaving greater opportunities in 
Illinois for witness abuse.  These changes were designed to insure that 
discovery is appropriately sequenced and not unduly burdensome. 
In reviewing witness protections, the article must necessarily confront 
a few foundational questions, including whether all witnesses should be 
similarly treated and, if not, which witnesses require special protections.  
For example, in some jurisdictions courts will consider, under the Apex 
Doctrine, the potential burden of a deposition relative to its likely benefits.   
Differentiated guidelines for entity leaders (and perhaps others) are often 
deemed necessary, in part, because:  (A) entity leaders usually know much 
less about the relevant facts than do others; (B) entity leaders with some 
knowledge are abused more frequently than others; and, (C) the economic 
costs to certain entity parties whose agents respond are far greater than the 
costs for witnesses generally.  The Apex Doctrine often supplements, and 
reinforces, written civil procedure laws promoting cost effective, 
convenient and nonduplicative information gathering. 
The article first explores appropriate guidelines for limiting future 
witness questioning at depositions, trials or hearings.  This exploration 
considers the possible adoption in Illinois of the federal meet and confer 
mandate, or perhaps a more explicit and demanding case management 
conference rule devoted to discovery scheduling. 
Next, current Illinois guidelines on the taking of depositions and on 
the giving of testimonies in trials and hearings are examined.  The article 
explores possible new norms, including a good cause requirement for 
scheduling certain witnesses; a requirement that alternative routes of 
information or evidence procurement first be explored for certain witnesses; 
and, new time, place and manner restrictions that help mitigate the costs of 
scheduled depositions and testimonies.  
Finally, the article explores possible judicial actions following witness 
abuses during depositions and testimonies, including sanctions on parties, 
their lawyers and their law firms.  Sanctions can involve public or private 
interests, thus encompassing both disciplinary referrals and costshifting. 
In assessing possible reforms, the article will also consider whether 
actions by the Illinois General Assembly or the Illinois Supreme Court are 
most appropriate.  While there is much shared civil procedure lawmaking 
authority, resulting in both significant Civil Procedure Code and Supreme 
Court Rule provisions on testimonial and nontestimonial witness 
presentations, certain initiatives may need to be primarily, or exclusively, 
legislative or judicial in nature.  Today, General Assembly authority over 




so-called statutory causes of action seems preeminent, while Supreme Court 
authority over certain civil jury trial procedures appears dominant.4  In 
assessing possible reforms, the article will not consider other discovery 
methods, like interrogatories (though clearly at least certain of the 
suggested reforms would prevent discovery abuses outside of depositions). 
 II. PREEMPTING WITNESS ABUSE 
Might certain witnesses be afforded opportunities to prevent 
altogether, or to limit, formal questioning of themselves even before they 
are summoned for questioning?  If so, which witnesses and what 
preemptive mechanisms are most appropriate? 
A. Federal Meet and Confer Practices 
In the federal district courts there are no explicit rules or statutes 
generally permitting party or nonparty witnesses to head off altogether, or 
to limit, unscheduled depositions.  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP) 26(c), only a party or any person “from whom discovery is sought” 
may move for a protective order.5  By contrast, under the general Illinois 
discovery rule,6  in civil actions any party or witness may seek “a protective 
order as justice requires, denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating 
discovery to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, 
disadvantage, or oppression.”   The general discovery rule in Illinois further 
recognizes that circuit courts “may supervise all or any part of any 
discovery procedure,” seemingly permitting sua sponte case-by-case 
judicial oversight ahead of discovery initiatives.7  The Illinois rule thus 
technically permits movants to seek witness protection orders in advance of 
any deposition notices.8 
Notwithstanding the more limiting language of FRCP 26(c), in the 
federal district courts many future abusive discovery initiatives are 
prevented via the so-called “meet and confer” provisions.  Under the 
                                                                                                                           
4. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Judicial Versus Legislative Authority After Lebron, 98 Ill. B.J. 324 
(2010). 
5. In at least one case, a court heard from a party seeking a protective order, under FRCP 26(c), that 
would foreclose a deposition of a certain witness, where no official deposition notice was 
mentioned.  Johnson v. Jung, 242 F.R.D. 481 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (pro se plaintiff, in earlier 
discussions and later emails, proposed to depose the entity defendant’s “general secretary and 
CEO”) [hereinafter Johnson]. 
6. ILLR 201(c)(1).   
7. ILLR 201(c)(2).  
8. No such cases under the rule could be found, however.  See also California Code of Civil 
Procedure 2025.420(a) (deponent may be protected by court order “before, during, or after a 
deposition).   
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Federal Rules, generally “a party may not seek discovery from any source 
before the parties have conferred.”9  A Rule 26(f) meet and confer typically 
results in a report10 which must contain “the parties’ views and proposals” 
on what “limitations should be imposed” regarding discovery.11  The report 
can lead directly to a scheduling order.12  The report can also lead to a 
scheduling conference,13 or a judicial consultation “by telephone, mail or 
other means,”14 that yields a scheduling order.  All scheduling orders “must 
limit” the time to complete discovery.15  Such a scheduling order can also 
“modify the extent of discovery”16 and can include “other appropriate 
matters” regarding any future discovery. 17  A scheduling order following a 
meet and confer must be issued “as soon as practicable” but no later than 
120 days after “any defendant has been served,” or no later than 90 days 
“after any defendant has appeared.”18  Where discovery meetings and any 
conferencing or consultations yield no agreements or orders limiting 
witness initiatives, a protective order request seeking to forestall witness 
abuse can still follow a deposition notice, or a hearing or trial testimony 
notice.19 
B.  Other State Meet and Confer Practices 
American state high court rules also often contain similar mandatory 
“meet and confer” provisions.  Thus, in Colorado there is no general 
opportunity for discovery, with exceptions comparable to those in the 
federal district courts,20 until there is submitted a proposed Case 
Management Conference Order.”21  In Alaska, for many civil cases,22 
except for interrogatories there is no “discovery from any source” before 
                                                                                                                           
9. FRCP 26(d)(1) (conferral requirements appear in FRCP 26(f)).  There are some exceptions under 
FRCP26(a)(1)(B) per FRCP 26(d)(1).  Exceptions may also be authorized by another federal rule, 
stipulation or court order.  FRCP 26(d)(1). 
10. FRCP 26(f)(2) (“written report” to the court 14 days after the conference that outlines “proposed 
discovery plan”). 
11. FRCP 26(f)(3)(E). 
12. FRCP 16(b)(1)(A). 
13. FRCP 16(b)(1)(B). 
14. FRCP 16(b)(1)(B). 
15. FRCP 16(b)(3)(A). 
16. FRCP 16(b)(3)(B)(ii). 
17. FRCP 16(b)(3)(B)(vi).   
18. FRCP 16(b)(2). 
19. See, e.g., FRCP 26(c) (protection from discovery request) and FRCP 45(c)(3) (protection from 
hearing or trial subpoena to testify).  
20. Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure (ColRCP) 26(d) (exceptions include court order and party 
agreement exemptions via CRCP). 
21. ColRCP 26(d).  The proposed order is guided by CRCP 16. 
22. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure (AkRCP) 16(d)(1) (cases where there are required disclosures per 
AkRCP 26(a)). 




the parties have met, conferred and developed “a proposed discovery 
plan,”23 which must indicate the parties’ views and proposals concerning 
“limitations” on formal discovery.24  By contrast, in Utah, for many civil 
cases25 there is “no discovery from any source” before the parties have met 
and conferred,26 including no interrogatories.  In Utah the goal is for the 
parties to “develop a stipulated discovery plan,” which “shall include” what 
“limitations on discovery” should be imposed and “whether discovery 
should be conducted in phases.”27 
C.  Federal and Other State Discovery Planning Practices 
Future abusive discovery initiatives can also be prevented where there 
are no mandated private party conferrals before discovery begins, but where 
such conferrals are strongly encouraged.  Such conferrals often occur while 
formal discovery is stayed.  Encouragement of voluntary conferrals was 
found within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) between 1980 and 
1993.28  That rule contemplated discovery conferences could be sought 
(though not “routinely”) by “counsel who has attempted without success to 
effect with opposing counsel a reasonable program or plan for discovery.”29   
The federal rulemakers determined “abuse can best be prevented by 
intervention by the court as soon as abuse is threatened.”30   
A variation of this former federal rule lives today in a variety of 
general state court discovery rules.  For example, in a civil action in North 
Dakota a trial judge may schedule “a discovery conference” at “any time,”31 
which must be followed by a court order “tentatively” identifying discovery 
issues; establishing a discovery plan; and, setting out discovery limits.32  
                                                                                                                           
23. AkRCP 26(d)(1) (conferral guidelines found in AkRCP 26(f)). 
24. AkRCP 26(f)(4). 
25. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure (UtRCP) 26(d) (per Rule 26(a)(2) exempted cases include contract 
claims where less than $20,000 is sought). 
26. UtRCP 26(d). 
27. The conferral, under UtRCP 26(d), references UtRCP 26(f) which dictates what must be in the 
plan. 
28. 1980 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 526.  Three Justices 
dissented, finding the new discovery rules (FRCP 26, 28, 30, 32, 33, 34, and 37) fell short of the 
changes “needed to accomplish reforms in civil litigation that are long overdue.”  Id. at 521 (J. 
Powell, joined by J. Stewart and J. Rehnquist).  The shortcomings are discussed, together with 
more significant reforms deemed necessary, in, e.g., Second Report of the Special Committee for 
the Study of Discovery Abuse, Section of Litigation, American Bar Association (revised draft 
Nov. 1980), found at 92 F.R.D. 137. 
29. Advisory Committee Note to 1980 Addition of FRCP 26(f), found at Revised Preliminary Draft of 
Proposed Amendments to the FRCP (February 1979), 80 F.R.D. 323, 332 [hereinafter 1980 
Advisory Note]. 
30. 1980 Advisory Note, 80 F.R.D. at 332. 
31. North Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure (NDRCP) 26(f)(1). 
32. NDRCP 26(f)(4). 
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There too, if “a party proposed making a discovery plan, each party has a 
duty to participate in good faith in the framing of the plan.”33  Then, if one 
party moves to have a discovery conference scheduled, “the court must 
order a discovery conference as long as the motion is in proper form.”34  
The general discovery rules in Delaware35 and Washington36 are 
comparable.   
Under the North Carolina general civil procedure rule on discovery, 
any party “may request a meeting on the subject of discovery,” but can do 
so “no earlier than 40 days after the complaint is filed.”37   Such a request 
usually prompts a meeting of the parties, often occurring more than 3 weeks 
after the request.38  The meeting typically results in the submission of a 
“discovery plan or joint report.”39  If there is no plan, any party can then 
compel a discovery conference.40  All the while discovery can proceed.41 
Elsewhere, guided as in North Dakota by a general civil procedure 
rule on formal discovery, American state trial judges have discretion to 
direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before them for discovery 
conferences, and must convene such conferences upon a properly-supported 
motion by an attorney for any party.42  Thus, some general discovery 
guidelines recognize judicial discretion to convene discovery conferences, 
                                                                                                                           
33. NDRCP 26(f)(3). 
34. NDRCP 26(f)(2).  The court must order a discovery conference if requested by a proper motion, 
which must include, inter alia, “a proposed discovery plan and schedule,” “proposed limitations 
on discovery” and an assurance that parties made “a reasonable effort to reach agreement on 
contentious matters that are set forth). 
35. Delaware Rule of Civil Procedure (DelRCP) 26(f).  Comparable is Hawaii Rule of Civil 
Procedure (HawRCP) 26(f); Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure (IoRCP) 1.507(1); Minnesota Civil 
Procedure Rule (MinnRCP) 26.06; South Carolina Civil Procedure Rule (SCRCP) 26(f); and 
Vermont Civil Procedure Rule (VtRCP) 26(f). 
36. Washington Superior Court Civil Rule (Wash SCCR) 26(f). 
37. North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure (NCRCP) 26(f)(1). 
38. NCRCP 26(f)(1) (if a request is filed, “the parties shall meet”). 
39. NCRCP 26(f)(2). 
40. NCRCP 26(f)(4) (if “parties are unable to agree . . . they shall, upon motion of any party, appear 
before the court for a discovery conference”). 
41. NCRCP 26(d).  See, e.g., Winston-Salem Joint Venture v. City of Winston-Salem, 65 N.C. App. 
532, 310 S.E.2d 58, 60 (N.C. App. 1983) (under General Practice Rule 8, all desired discovery 
shall be completed within 120 days of the last required pleading; and discovery should begin 
“promptly . . . even before the pleadings are completed”).  
42. See, e.g., Montana Rule of Civil Procedure (MtRCP) 26(f); West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 
(WVaRCP) 26(f) (recognizing that such conference may be done "personally or by telephone”); 
Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure (MissRCP) 26(c); and Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 
(WyRCP) 26(f).  See also VtRCP 26(f) (court “may direct the attorneys to appear at a discovery 
conference; rule later says discovery conference may be combined with “a pretrial conference,” 
“subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a discovery conference to prompt 
convening of the conference”). 




but no duties regarding good faith dealings regarding discovery plans or 
mandated conferrals at the urging of a single party.43 
Outside the general discovery rules, some American courts also 
encourage, if not require, discovery planning, often ahead of any formal 
discovery initiatives.  There are frequently general civil practice rules on 
pretrial/scheduling/case management conferences which anticipate, inter 
alia, judicially-supervised discovery planning.  In the federal district courts, 
as noted, there is mandated discovery planning by the parties under the 
general discovery rule, followed by a scheduling order.44  Under the general 
federal pretrial conference rule, however, there will follow as well a 
“scheduling order” regarding discovery not only upon the mandated meet 
and confer on discovery,45 but also upon a judicial pretrial conference on 
discovery.46  Following a pretrial conference where there was no meet and 
confer, a federal district judge can “take appropriate action” to “obtain 
admissions and stipulations . . . to avoid unnecessary proof;”47 to control 
and schedule discovery;48 and to facilitate “just, speedy and inexpensive 
disposition.”49 
Comparably, American state high court rules on pretrial/scheduling/ 
case management conferencing invite, if not require, significant judicial 
involvement in discovery management, in some part at least, to preempt 
witness (and other discovery) abuse.  For example, in Arizona, upon written 
request, the trial court “shall” schedule “a comprehensive pretrial 
conference” at which the court may make a discovery schedule; guide the 
production of electronically stored information; and set forth measures on 
preservation of discoverable documents.50  In Alaska, a “scheduling 
order”51 is often entered in civil cases52 after a scheduling conference53 
                                                                                                                           
43. Alabama Civil Procedure Rule (AlaRCP) 26(f). 
44. FRCP 26(f)(1) (exemptions include cases listed in FRCP 26(a)(1)(B) [e.g., administrative review, 
in rem forfeiture, habeas corpus, student loan collection and U.S. benefit recovery claims] or cases 
where “the court orders otherwise”]. 
45. FRCP 16(b)(1)(A). 
46. Under FRCP 16(a), pretrial conferencing unrelated to mandated discovery planning via the meet 
and confer seemingly can be scheduled upon motion or sua sponte.  Comparable state court rules 
include Kentucky Civil Procedure Rule (KyRCP) 16(1) and MinnRCP 16.  
47. FRCP 16(c)(2)(C).  
48. FRCP 16(c)(2)(F).  
49. FRCP 16(c)(2)(P).  
50. Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (AzRCP) 16(b)(1) (except in medical malpractice cases).  
Comprehensive pretrial conferences on, inter alia, formal discovery are also usually held in 
medical malpractice cases.  AzRCP16(c).  
51. AkRCP 16(b)(1). 
52. AkRCP 16(g) (“exempted” cases include, inter alia, paternity, custody, habeas corpus, small 
claims, and eminent domain cases). 
53. AkRCP 16(b)(2) (conference can be judicially determined to be “unnecessary” or replaced by “a 
local uniform” procedure). 
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“within 90 days after the appearance of the defendants”;54 this order 
typically addresses “the control and scheduling of discovery” and the 
facilitation of a “just, speedy and inexpensive disposition.”55  In New 
Mexico, a scheduling order on discovery completion follows judicial 
consultation “with the attorneys and any unrepresented parties, by a 
scheduling conference, telephone, mail, or other suitable means.”56  In 
Maine, in most civil cases after the filing of an answer, the trial court “shall 
enter a standard scheduling order setting deadlines for a conference of 
counsel concerning discovery . . . the exchange of expert witness 
designations and reports . . . [and] the completion of discovery.”57  In 
Alabama the court may direct the attorneys “to appear . . . for a conference 
on the subject of discovery.”58 
D.  Federal and Other State Relevancy Practices 
Future abusive discovery can also be lessened by narrowing or 
excepting the relevancy requirement.  In the federal district courts, “unless 
otherwise limited by court order,” one can seek via discovery only 
“nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”59  
Similar relevancy requirements are found, inter alia, in Mississippi, where 
discovery must be “relevant to the issues raised by the claims or defenses of 
any party,”60 and in North Dakota, where discovery must be “relevant to 
any party’s claim or defense.”61  Here, fishing expeditions are less likely 
than where discovery must only be generally relevant to the subject matter 
of the lawsuit.62   
                                                                                                                           
54. AkRCP 16(b)(1). 
55. AkRCP 16(c )(6) and (16). 
56. New Mexico Rule of Civil Procedure for the District Courts (NMRCP) 16B(3).  Comparable is 
WVaRCP 16(a); Arkansas Civil Procedure Rule (ArkRCP) 16; MinnRCP 16; and MtRCP 16. 
57. Maine Civil Procedure Rule (MeRCP) 16(a)(1) (exempted are proceedings under Rules 80, 80B 
or 80C). 
58. AlaRCP 26(f). 
59. FRCP 26(b)(1). 
60. MissRCP 26(b)(1). 
61. NDRCP 26(b)(1)(A).  Similar is Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure (OrRCP) 36B(1), WyRCP 
26(b)(1), and ColRCP 26(b)(1). 
62. In 2000, FRCP 26 was amended to go from relevance of the subject matter to relevance to any 
party’s claim or defense.  The purpose was to limit discovery abuse and reduce discovery costs.  
The Advisory Committee Note to the 2000 amendment observed that this change had been 
considered in 1978 but was withdrawn, and that even with other discovery amendments “concerns 
about costs and delay of discovery have persisted nonetheless.”  The Committee Note recognized 
that the “dividing line” between subject matter relevance and claim or defense relevance “cannot 
be defined with precision.”  Amendments to FRCP, FRE, FRCrP and FR BP (effective 12-1-
2000), 192 F.R.D. 340, 388-390.  Some question whether the goals have been or could be met.  
See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the Scope of 
Federal Civil Discovery, 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 13, 14 (2001) (“I fear that the amendment may lead to 




Further, future abusive discovery can further be lessened by 
disallowing certain discovery initiatives even when relevant, i.e., by 
recognizing exceptions where relevant inquiries are forbidden.  Elsewhere 
in the United States such exceptions include cost/benefit analyses barring 
unworthy information gathering requests.  Thus, in the federal judiciary, a 
court “on motion or on its own must limit the frequency or extent of 
discovery otherwise allowed . . . if it determines that: (i) the discovery 
sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from 
some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less 
expensive . . . [or that] (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount 
in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at 
stake...and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.”63  In 
advance of discovery, a federal litigant must consider such a cost/benefit 
analysis.64  Comparable cost/benefit analyses are required in several states 
before relevant discovery is sought.65 
E.  Illinois Prediscovery Practices 
In Illinois civil actions there are no mandated prediscovery 
conferences.66  There is, as noted, an explicit recognition in the Illinois 
general civil procedure rule on formal discovery that circuit judges “may 
supervise all or any part of any discovery procedure.”67  However, there is 
no explicit recognition in the general discovery rule of a party’s ability to 
propose making a discovery plan, or of a party’s duty to act in good faith 
                                                                                                                           
little positive change by way of curbing cost and excess in federal discovery, while increasing 
purely procedural contention over the multiple and vague terms in the revised rule”).   
 Subject matter, rather than claim or defense, relevance remains the standard in some states.  See, 
e.g., AlaRCP 26(b)(1); AkRCP 26(b)(1); and AzRCP 26(b)(1).  
63. FRCP 26(b)(2)(C).   
64. FRCP 26(g)(1)(B)(iii).  In contemplating discovery, certain federal litigants must also abide by 
local court standards (i.e., on civility) that go beyond civil procedure and professional conducts 
norms.  See, e.g., Standards for Professional Conduct Within the Seventh Judicial Circuit 
(voluntary adherence sought as standards “shall not be used as a basis for litigation or for 
sanctions or penalties”) and U.S. District Court, District of Nebraska, Local Rule 45.1(a) (“No 
subpoenas for production or inspection on a nonparty without giving adverse party notice”). 
65. See infra notes 89-100. 
66. There are mandatory attempts in Illinois by parties to resolve “differences over discovery” 
initiatives before judicial action can be sought.  ILLR 201(k).  Other states also permit discovery 
without an earlier “meet and confer.”  See, e.g., AlaRCP 26(d); DelRCP 26(d); HawRCP 26(d); 
Indiana Civil Procedure Rule (IndRCP) 26(D); and MissRCP 26(e). 
67. ILLR 201(c)(2).  Many of the cases utilizing this rule involve judicial authority to review possible 
discovery materials in camera after objections have been raised to their compelled disclosure.  
See, e.g., In re Estate of Bagus, 294 Ill. App. 3d 887, 229 Ill. Dec. 291, 691 N.E.2d 401, 404 (Ill. 
App. 2d 1998) (in camera proceeding when privilege regarding psychiatrist’s “personal notes” are 
sought) and Youle v. Ryan, 349 Ill. App. 3d 377, 285 Ill. Dec. 402, 811 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ill. 
App. 4th 2004) (in camera proceeding when relevance of surgical database is questioned). 
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when the making of a plan is suggested, or of a court’s obligation to 
convene a discovery scheduling conference upon a party’s request.68  And 
there is no required cost/benefit analysis before a discovery request is 
made.69  Abusive discovery tactics can thrive in an environment without 
such guidelines. 
Furthermore, the sua sponte supervision of “any discovery procedure” 
in Illinois in order to prevent future abusive discovery initiatives seems 
very limited as other rules require actual party initiatives in advance of 
judicial supervision and judicial orders on discovery.  For example, a 
portion of the general discovery rule says “methods of discovery may be 
used in any sequence” and all parties may engage in discovery 
simultaneously, “unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of 
parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders otherwise.”70  
Typically, this rule provision is employed only after discovery has been 
sought.  Also, the Illinois rule on taking depositions suggests there can be 
no sua sponte orders that limit or extend the three hour time for a discovery 
deposition.71 
In Illinois, formal discovery can start for major civil cases72 once “all 
defendants have appeared or are required to appear.”73  Thus, motions 
regarding limits on future depositions and other discovery can be difficult 
to pursue because an adverse party’s intentions are more likely unknown 
early in litigation as there are no compelled disclosures in major Illinois 
civil actions.74  This lack of knowledge can chill motions to limit discovery 
in advance of any discovery request since all motions require “reasonable 
inquiry” ahead of time,75 which is especially hard for plaintiffs before 
defendants appear. 
The case management conference rule in Illinois does generally 
require a conference at which there must be considered, inter alia, 
“limitations on discovery.”76  But this conference can occur more than six 
months “following the filing of the complaint,” though it must occur 
                                                                                                                           
68. ILLR 201. 
69. ILLR 201. 
70. ILLR 201(e).  See also ILLR 201(f) (no delay in the trial of a case “to permit discovery unless due 
diligence is shown”). 
71. ILLR 206(d) (three hours “except by stipulation of all parties or by order upon showing that good 
cause warrants a lengthier examination”).  In Illinois there are two types of depositions, an 
evidence deposition (generally for use at a hearing or trial) and a discovery deposition (generally 
employed to gather information, so that hearsay is of little concern).  ILLR 202. 
72. For civil actions involving less than $50,000, the “limited and simplified discovery procedures” 
provide less opportunity for formal discovery.  ILLR 222. 
73. ILLR 201(d) (beforehand, there is needed “leave of court granted upon good cause”). 
74. But see ILLR 222 (compelled disclosures in many civil cases involving less than $50,000). 
75. ILLR 137. 
76. ILLR 218(a)(5). 




“within 35 days after the parties are at issue.”77  Thus, any required 
discovery conferencing can occur in Illinois long after formal discovery has 
begun.  The required initial case management conference in Illinois is 
expressly guided solely by the standard that the rule is to be “liberally 
construed to do substantial justice between and among the parties.”78 The 
rule says nothing, for example, about cost/benefit analyses or about 
protecting nonparty witnesses who might be scheduled for depositions.79 
Finally, civil discovery in Illinois is appropriate for “any matter 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,”80 rather than 
to a “claim or defense” as, e.g., in the federal district courts.  Fishing 
expeditions are easy in Illinois, especially as there is also no required 
cost/benefit analysis ahead of any discovery initiative.81 
Deposition abuse in Illinois circuit courts is, however, less likely in 
minor civil cases, that is, where claimants seek money damages not in 
excess of $50,000, exclusive of interests and costs.82  Here, the “limited and 
simplified discovery” rule restricts any discovery depositions, absent court 
order, to the following:  (a) parties, where an entity that is a party need only 
have one representative deposed; and (b) treating physicians and experts, 
but only if “they have been identified as witnesses who will testify at 
trial.”83  Further, in such minor civil cases there are no evidence depositions 
“except pursuant to leave of court for good cause shown.”84  To curtail 
deposition (and other discovery) abuse, the dollar amount applicable to all 
limited and simplified discovery cases could be raised.  Yet this approach 
has drawbacks as compared to prediscovery meet and confer85 and 
cost/benefit mandates.86 
                                                                                                                           
77. ILLR 218(a).  At issue is undefined.  But see ColRCP 16(b)(1)(at issue means, inter alia, all 
permitted pleadings have been filed or defaults or dismissals entered against all non-appearing 
parties). 
78. ILLR 218(c).  
79. ILLR 202 (via deposition “testimony of any party or person”). 
80. ILLR 201(b)(1). 
81. It should be noted that the “subject matter” test for discovery relevancy still operates in many 
other American state trial courts, though in some there is also a mandated predisovery cost/benefit 
analysis, as in Michigan, under Michigan Rule of Civil Procedure (MichRCP) 2.302(B)(1) and 
2.302(G)(3); Nevada, under Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure (NevRCP) 26(b)(1) and 26(g)(2); 
Utah, under UtRCP 26(b)(1) and 26(g); Vermont, under VtRCP 26(b)(1) and 26(g); and West 
Virginia, under WVaRCP 26(b)(1) and 26(g). 
82. In small claims cases, involving less than $10,000, under ILLR 281 there are no depositions 
“except by leave of court,” ILLR 287(a). 
83. ILLR 222(f)(2). 
84. ILLR 222(f)(3).   
85. FRCP 26(d)(1) and 26(f). 
86. The baby should not be thrown out with the bathwater.  Civil cases involving more money should 
have broader opportunities for information gathering than lower dollar cases because economic 
efficiencies differ, with parties initially trusted to their own calculations, assuming effective 
devices to curtail and sanction abuses. 
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 II. LIMITING AND FORECLOSING SCHEDULED DEPOSITIONS 
AND TRIAL AND HEARING TESTIMONIES 
Once scheduled, how might witnesses limit or foreclosure deposition, 
trial or hearing testimonies to prevent abuse?  Should witnesses be afforded 
explicit avenues to seek protections before arriving for the scheduled 
questioning? 
A.  Limiting and Foreclosing Scheduled Depositions 
1.  Federal Deposition Limits 
As noted, in the federal district courts, relevant discovery requests, 
including deposition notices, can be limited or foreclosed when alternative 
information sources are available or costs are too high.  A discovery request 
also cannot be initiated in a federal civil action unless the requesting party 
explicitly certifies that the request is “neither unreasonable nor unduly 
burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the case, prior discovery 
in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at 
stake in the action.”87  Further, even with such a certification, a district 
court may alter deposition practices or halt depositions if it determines the 
discovery sought, that is “otherwise allowed,” nevertheless is 
“unreasonably cumulative or duplicate, or can be obtained from some other 
source that is more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive,” or that 
the party seeking the discovery “had ample opportunity to obtain the 
information by discovery,” or that “the burden or expense” of proposed 
discovery “outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, 
the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the 
issues at stake in the action and the importance of the discovery in resolving 
the issues.”88  Finally, even assuming a proper certification and no such 
judicial determination, presumably a federal district court can still consider 
the issuance of a protective order.89 
                                                                                                                           
87. FRCP 26(g)(1)(B)(iii).  This rule took effect in December, 1983.  Its rationale is found in the 
Advisory Committee Note, found in 1983 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 218-
220 (“litigants . . . must be obliged to act responsibly and avoid abuse”) [hereinafter 1983 FRCP 
Amendments]. 
88. FRCP 26(b)(2)(C).  There are special limitations when there is discovery of electronically stored 
information.  FRCP 26(b)(2)(B).  Those limits are discussed in Theodore C. Hirt, The Quest for 
“Proportionality” in Electronic Discovery – Moving From Theory to Reality in Civil Litigation, 5 
The Federal Courts Law Review 171 (2011). 
89. FRCP 26(c)(1) (protection against “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden”).  
See, e.g., In re Subpoena Issued to Dennis Friedman, 350 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003) (on insulating 
lawyers from depositions; not automatically immune) [hereinafter Friedman]; Salter v. Upjohn 
Co., 593 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1979) (no deposition of corporate defendant’s president until other 




2.  Other State Deposition Limits 
Some American state trial court practices are comparable.  There are 
similar certification standards for discovery requests in Wyoming,90 
Michigan,91 Vermont,92 Rhode Island,93 Kansas,94 Montana,95 West 
Virginia,96 North Dakota,97 Nevada,98 Colorado99 and Virginia.100  And 
there  are similar avenues to halt “otherwise allowed” discovery on grounds 
involving, inter alia, cost-benefit analyses in Wyoming,101 Alaska,102 
Utah,103 Alabama,104 Montana,105 Vermont,106 Kansas,107 West Virginia,108 
North Dakota,109 Tennessee,110 Minnesota,111 Nevada,112 Arizona,113 
Colorado,114 Washington,115  and Virginia.116 
                                                                                                                           
employees with more firsthand knowledge were deposed) [hereinafter Salter]; Graves v. Bowles, 
419 Fed. App. 640 (6th Cir. 2011) (protective order barring mayor’s deposition as mayor’s 
affidavits showed he lacked personal knowledge) [hereinafter Graves]; Misc. Docket #1 v. Misc. 
Docket #2, 197 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 1999) (quashing of subpoena to former CEO due to particularly 
serious embarrassment) [hereinafter Misc. Docket #1]; Home Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Gillam, 952 
F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1991) (protective order to prevent deposition of former bank officer who had 
no relevant information) [hereinafter Gillam]. 
90. WyRCP 26(g)(2). 
91. MichRCP 2.302(G)(3). 
92. VtRCP 26(g). 
93. Rhode Island Superior Court Civil Procedure Rule (RIRCP) 26(f). 
94. Kansas Stat. 60-226(f). 
95. MtRCP 26(g). 
96. WVaRCP 26(g). 
97. NDRCP (26(g)(1). 
98. NevRCP 26(g)(2). 
99. ColRCP 26(g)(2). 
100. Virginia Supreme Court Rule (VaSCR) 4:1(g).  The comparable Utah certification provision, in 
former UtRCP 26(g), was eliminated in November, 2011, but only after new compulsory 
disclosure standards were added, UtRCP 26(a), as well as new proportionality standards 
(involving, in part, cost/benefit analyses), UtRCP 26(b)(2). 
101. WyRCP 26(b)(2)(c).  
102. AkRCP 26(b)(2)(A). 
103. UtRCP 26(b)(2)(discovering party needs both relevance and “proportionality” (defined to include 
benefits outweighing costs) and UtRCP 26(b)(3) (court can insure discovering party’s request 
meets proportionality via UtRCP 37 orders). 
104. AlabRCP 26(b)(2)(A) (sua sponte orders allowed after notice). 
105. MtRCP 26(b)(2)(c).  
106. VtRCP 26(b)(1). 
107. Kansas Stat. 60-226(b)(2)(A) (sua sponte orders allowed after notice). 
108. WVaRCP 26(b)(1) (sua sponte orders allowed after notice). 
109. NDRCP 26(b)(1) (sua sponte orders allowed). 
110. Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure (TnRCP) 26.02(1) (sua sponte orders allowed after notice). 
111. MinnRCP 26.02(b)L(3) (sua sponte orders allowed after notice). 
112. NevRCP 26(b)(1) (sua sponte orders allowed after notice). 
113. AzRCP 26(b)(1)(a) (sua sponte orders allowed after notice). 
114. ColRCP 26 (b)(2)(F). 
115. Wash SCCR 26(g). 
116. VaSCR 4:1(b)() (sua sponte orders allowed after notice). 
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3.  Policies Underlying Deposition Limits 
Federal and state general discovery certification obligations of counsel 
not only seek to deter discovery abuse, but also to limit wasteful 
expenditures of judicial resources used in foreclosing clearly unwarranted 
discovery into concededly relevant information.  One federal magistrate 
judge aptly observed that with these obligations, counsel also must take into 
account all the circumstances, that the information sought is of sufficient 
potential significance to justify the burden the discovery would impose, that 
the discovery tool selected is the most efficacious means that might be used 
to acquire the desired information (taking into account cost effectiveness 
and the nature of the information being sought), and that the timing of the 
probe is sensible, i.e., that there is no other juncture in the pretrial period 
where there would be a clearly happier balance between the benefit derived 
and the burdens imposed by the particular discovery effort.117 
Beyond general discovery certification requirements, applicable, e.g., 
to interrogatories as well as depositions, there can be special certification or 
other standards applicable only to certain discovery, like deposition 
initiatives.  A subpoena for attendance at a deposition is normally issued by 
the trial court and is limited to certain locations, sometimes explicitly 
different for residents and nonresidents of the issuing state.118  In some 
jurisdictions properly scheduled deponents then must seek court protection, 
as from inquiries into privileged or other protected matter [made via 
document inspection or copying requests] or from “undue burden or 
expense.”119  Elsewhere, deposition initiatives require more up front, like 
requiring those “responsible” for the subpoena to “take reasonable steps to 
avoid imposing an undue burden or expense” on the deponent.120  Certain 
depositions cannot even be scheduled without a court order.121   
                                                                                                                           
117. In re Convergent Technologies Securities Litigation, 108 F.R.D. 328, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1985) 
(emphasis in original). 
118. See, e.g., MissRCP 45(a)(1) and (b) (different); TnRCP 45.04(1) and (2) (different); WVaRCP 
45(a)(1)(A) and (c) (no difference); Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure (MassRCP) 45(a) and 
(d)(2) (different); and ColRCP 45 (d)(2) (different). 
119. See, e.g., MissRCP 45(d)(1)(A)(ii) and (iv).  See also MassRCP 45(b) (subpoena involving 
documentary evidence may be quashed if “unreasonable and oppressive”); ColRCP 45(b) (similar 
to MassRCP45(b)); RIRCP 45(b) (similar to MassRCP 45(b)); and Arkansas Civil Procedure Rule 
(ArkRCP) 45(b)(2) (similar to MassRCP 45(b)). 
120. See, e.g., AlaRCP 45 (c)(1); WVaRCP 45(d)(1); NCRCP 45 (c)(1); and Nevada Rule of Civil 
Procedure (NevRCP) 45 (c)(1). 
121. See, e.g., ColRCP 30(a)(2) (leave of court needed when a proposed deposition would “result in 
more depositions than set forth in the Case Management Order;” involves one already deposed; 
or, involves one “confined in prison”); 12 Okla. Stat. 3230 A (2) (confined in prison or already 
deposed); RIRCP 30(a)(2) (confined in prison or already deposed); and OrRCP Rule 39B (person 
confined in a prison or jail). 




The availability of sua sponte orders limiting discovery of “otherwise 
allowed” materials is also premised on both the deterrence of abuse and the 
saving of expense.  The Note accompanying the 1984 Arizona rule changes 
allowing sua sponte limits on the frequency or extent of use of discovery to 
gain relevant information were “intended to reduce redundancy in 
discovery and require counsel  to be sensitive to the comparative costs of 
different methods of securing information,” as well as to “minimize 
repetitiveness and to oblige lawyers to think through their discovery 
activities in advance” and to facilitate discovery “that is disproportionate to 
the individual lawsuit as measured by various factors, e.g., its nature and 
complexity, the importance of the issues at stake, [and] the financial 
position of the parties.”122 
Since at least 1983, federal district judges have also been affirmatively 
charged with controlling discovery abuses, as earlier problems led the 
Advisory Committee to note regarding its proposed Rule 26 amendments: 
Excessive discovery and evasion or resistance to reasonable discovery 
requests pose significant problems . . . the spirit of the rules is violated 
when advocates attempt to use discovery tools as tactical weapons rather 
than to expose the facts and illuminate the issues by overuse of discovery or 
unnecessary use of defensive weapons or evasive responses.  All of this 
results in excessively costly and time-consuming activities that are 
disproportionate to the case, the amount involved, or the issues or values at 
stake. 
4.  Illinois Deposition Limits 
By contrast, in Illinois there are no special certification requirements 
for discovery requests.  The Illinois rule123 governs alike pleadings, motions 
and other papers.  It contains no required cost/benefit analysis, or 
certification regarding duplication or alternative information sources, by 
one seeking discovery.   
A protective order limiting a deposition subpoena in an Illinois circuit 
court is appropriate “as justice requires” in order “to prevent unreasonable 
annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage or oppression.”124  The 
                                                                                                                           
122. Note accompanying AzRCP 26(b)(1) (further declaring judges should “prevent use of discovery 
to wage a war of attrition” and prevent discovery being employed “to coerce a party, whether 
affluent or financially weak”). 
123. ILLR 137.  Compare FRCP 11(d) (discovery papers not certified under the standards for 
pleadings and motions).  
124. ILLR 201(c).  A protective order limiting a trial testimony subpoena must be supported by “good 
cause shown.”  735 ILCS 5/2-1101.  Once a deposition has begun, limits on its continuation can 
be judicially imposed upon a showing that the witness examination was “being conducted in bad 
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“justice” standard in Illinois has been recognized as delegating quite broad 
judicial discretion, leaving parties and witnesses noticed for questioning 
somewhat uncertain about the limits on discovery interrogations, including 
any restraints arising from a cost/benefit analysis.125  The Illinois Supreme 
Court has declared the “parameters of protective orders are entrusted to the 
trial court’s discretion,” with no alteration on appeal unless “no reasonable 
person could adopt the view taken by the circuit court.”126  As later read by 
the Appellate Court, this means a protective order stands as long as the 
movant seeking the protective order shows “some valid reason.”127  
Reversal occurs only when there has been an abuse of discretion.128 
5.  Apex Doctrine Limits on Depositions 
To date, the Illinois state courts have not generally recognized in their 
decisions on protective order relief, or otherwise, how the Apex Doctrine 
might limit or foreclose scheduled depositions of certain officers/ 
agents/employees of entities who are parties to civil litigation.  The doctrine 
recognizes that differing treatments should be accorded to the depositions 
of higher level officials within corporate, governmental, or other entities, 
where the officials have no personal knowledge of entity actions prompting 
the civil litigation.129  Many federal and other American courts have utilized 
                                                                                                                           
faith” or in a manner that “unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the deponent or 
party.”  ILLR 206(d). 
125. In other respects protective orders in Illinois circuit courts are also subject to broad discretion.  
See, e.g., Jo Anna Pollock, Evaluating Protective Orders for Discovery Materials, 99 Ill. B.J. 576, 
577 (Nov. 2011) (on protective orders for trade secrets and other confidential matters, “there is a 
dearth of Illinois state case law” and “unlike federal law . . . no requirement for establishing good 
cause”). 
126. Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 191 Ill.2d 214, 246 Ill. Dec. 324, 730 N.E.2d 4, 12 (2000). 
127. Willeford v. Toys “R” Us-Delaware, Inc., 385 Ill. App. 3d 265, 324 Ill. Dec. 83, 895 N.E.2d 83, 
93 (Ill. App. 5th 2008) [hereinafter Willeford].  Seemingly, protective orders can be sought both 
in advance of a scheduled deposition and during a deposition.  Local rules can address how 
witness protections can be sought during depositions.  See, e.g., U.S. Dist. Ct., N.D. of Ind., Local 
Rule 37-3 (good faith attempts to resolve problems and submissions of objections by phone 
during a recess). 
128. Willeford, 895 N.E.2d at 89 (de novo standard applies, however, to determine whether the trial 
court “applied the correct standard”).  In certain types of cases, abuse of discretion may occur as a 
matter of law, as when the court denies discovery of materials deemed always unavailable.  See, 
e.g., People v. Schmidt, 56 Ill.2d 572, 575, 309 N.E.2d 557 (1974) (in misdemeanor cases, 
discovery by defendant includes, at least, (1) a list of witnesses; (2) any confessions by the 
defendant; and (3) evidence negating defendant’s guilt).  Also see People v. Teller, 207 Ill. App. 
3d 346, 152 Ill. Dec. 364, 565 N.E.2d 1046, 1048-9 (Ill. App. 2d 1991) (further discovery beyond 
Schmidt is within trial court’s discretion, which must protect against an “oppressive” subpoena 
that was nothing more than “a general fishing expedition”) [hereinafter Teller]. 
129. There are also other different treatments of nonparty persons who are or are not affiliated with a 
corporate party in written civil procedure laws.  See, e.g., FRCP 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) (a nonparty who is 
not a party officer may quash a subpoena to attend a deposition requiring the person to travel 
more than 100 miles from where that “person resides, is employed or regularly transacts business 




the doctrine, or employed the factors underlying the doctrine, to restrain 
otherwise appropriate discovery.  Even when courts decline to adopt the 
doctrine per se, they still recognize that, at times, entity officials may be 
subjected to only limited, if any, depositions under certain circumstances.  
Thus, it is fair to say that American courts outside Illinois, while having 
varied approaches to the doctrine, all recognize the doctrine.  Effectively, 
the doctrine is a sequencing device, requiring particular conditions be met 
before certain entity officials may be deposed.  It is not a bar to any 
deposition of an official at the apex.  In Illinois, the doctrine has not yet 
been widely recognized as a restraint on very costly, duplicative and low 
value discovery. 
One variation in the Apex Doctrine involves the standards on what 
information/evidence is required initially by one seeking to limit or 
foreclose a scheduled deposition. Another difference involves what role, if 
any, alternative sources of information play in assessing protective order 
requests.  The variations in the Apex Doctrine are well illustrated by a 
review of a few leading cases.130 
In Texas, the Supreme Court ruled in 1995131 on limiting via a 
protective order the deposition of “a corporate officer at the apex of the 
corporate hierarchy.”132  The decision noted that “as virtually every court 
which has addressed the subject has observed, depositions of persons in the 
upper level of management of corporations often involved in lawsuits 
present problems which should reasonably be accommodated in the 
discovery process.”133  In the Texas case, the targeted corporate officer 
sought accommodations from the burdens of an oral deposition and a 
subpoena asking for thirty-two categories of documents.134  The officer’s 
                                                                                                                           
in person” while a nonparty who is a party officer may be compelled to attend a deposition as long 
as there is no “undue burden”).   
130. On occasion, the doctrine is codified.  See, e.g., U.S. District Court for the E.D. of New York, 
Standing Orders of the Court on Effective Discovery in Civil Cases, 102 F.R.D. 339, 350 (Order 
III, Number 10 states “an officer, director or managing agent” or “a government official,” when 
served with a notice of deposition or subpoena “regarding a matter about which he or she has no 
knowledge,” can submit an affidavit “so stating and identifying a person . . . having knowledge;” 
notwithstanding such an affidavit, the noticing party can “proceed with the deposition, subject to 
the witness’ right to seek a protective order”). 
131. A recent Texas decision on the doctrine is In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 305 S.W.3d 849, 859 
(Tex. App. 2010) (trial court erred in compelling deposition of airline’s CEO as plaintiffs failed to 
show unique awareness or that less intrusive means could not be used to access information 
sought).  The Texas precedents are reviewed in Note, In re Alcatel-Just Another Weapon for 
Discovery Reform, 53 Baylor L. Rev. 269 (2001). 
132. Crown Central Petroleum Corporation v. Garcia, 904 S.W.2d 125, 126 (Tex. 1995) (case involved 
a requested video deposition of the corporate defendant’s “chairman of the board and chief 
executive officer” where the plaintiffs’ claims involved their decedent’s exposure to asbestos 
while a corporate employee) [hereinafter Crown Central]. 
133. Crown Central, 904 S.W.2d at 128. 
134. Id. at 126-127. 
810 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 36 
 
affidavit stated he had “no personal knowledge” of the decedent, or of the 
decedent’s “job duties, job performance, or any facts concerning” the 
decedent’s alleged injuries.135 As well, the officer said he had no knowledge 
of similar injuries to employees within the corporation and no expertise 
regarding such injuries.136  The Texas court ruled that with such an 
affidavit, plaintiffs then needed to show the official had “unique or superior 
personal knowledge of discoverable information,” or else “attempt to obtain 
the discovery through less intrusive methods.”137  Later, should there be 
reason to believe the officer’s deposition may “lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence” and should “less intrusive methods” be found 
“unsatisfactory, insufficient or inadequate,” the decision noted that a 
deposition could then be scheduled.138 
A federal magistrate judge in Illinois in 2007 came to a different 
conclusion after employing the same analyses, but faced with very different 
facts.  There, in a case involving race and national origin discrimination in 
employment as well as unlawful retaliation, a pro se plaintiff was interested 
in deposing the defendant Board’s “general secretary and CEO.”139  The 
Board failed to respond in a timely manner to the pro se plaintiff’s 
expression of interest though it was asked to do so given the “discovery 
deadline.”140  The later response by the Board was an email by its lawyers 
that they did “not believe” the targeted officer had any relevant knowledge 
and that the plaintiff should “explain” why she believed the officer had 
relevant information.141  Plaintiff responded by pointing out emails from the 
Board’s human resources department to the officer regarding “plaintiff’s 
job interviews.”142  At that point, the Board’s counsel moved for a 
protective order, arguing “no personal involvement” and that the officer 
was “too busy to be deposed, given her extensive travel commitments” for 
work.143 
In denying the protective order request, the judge said “conclusory 
statements of hardship in the officer’s affidavit” were insufficient to show 
the necessary “good cause.”144  The judge found the affidavit did not clearly 
demonstrate that no relevant information, even if inadmissible as evidence, 
could be obtained at a deposition.  The judge noted the officer had been 
                                                                                                                           
135. Id. at 127. 
136. Id. at 127. 
137. Id. at 128. 
138. Id. at 128. 
139. Johnson, 242 F.R.D. at 482. 
140. Id. at 482. 
141. Id. at 482.  
142. Id. at 482. 
143. Id. at 482. 
144. Id. at 483 (affidavit did not say the officer had “no information” regarding plaintiff’s claims). 




“kept apprised” of plaintiff’s “internal complaints”145 and had received 
from a pensioner “a letter commending the plaintiff’s work.”146  Further, the 
judge found the officer’s travel obligations had been dramatically 
overstated “in open court.”147 
While denying the protective order, with raised eyebrows as to the 
Board’s and officer’s claims,148 the judge nevertheless did recognize 
judicial discretion would support such an order where “all the available 
information” demonstrates “there is no likelihood that a witness has 
knowledge of relevant facts.”149  An earlier Seventh Circuit decision held 
that a protective order on behalf of a high-ranking corporate executive who 
was scheduled for a deposition could also be grounded on the initiating 
party’s failure to utilize less expensive and more convenient methods (i.e., 
interrogatories) to learn whether the executive even had any relevant 
information.150 
Other courts have recognized the policies underlying the Apex 
Doctrine are applicable in certain circumstances and have concluded the 
Doctrine does not go far enough.  For example, while the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court refused in 2007 to follow the Texas precedent,151 it did so 
only because the burden initially placed on the apex officer at the trial level 
was too weak.  The Oklahoma high court ruled the officer seeking 
protection, not the discovering party as in Texas, must show no “unique or 
superior personal knowledge of discoverable information” relating to the 
case152 and must uncover the “less intrusive methods” available to the 
discovering party for the information that is sought153 (and perhaps show, as 
well, undue burden and the like on the officer seeking protection154).  Had 
this been done, rather than providing a simple “blanket” statement declaring 
                                                                                                                           
145. Id. at 484. 
146. Id. at 485. 
147. Id. at 486 and 486 n.3 (in open court the officer was said to travel three-fourths of the year, but in 
her affidavit the officer claimed to travel thirty percent of the time). 
148. The judge, e.g., noted their claims amounted to “the I’m too important argument” and that if the 
U.S. President could be deposed, so could this particular officer.  Id. at 486. 
149. Id. at 484 (relying, inter alia, on a case where the IBM board chairman “testified via affidavit that 
he lacked personal knowledge of any facts supporting plaintiff’s age discrimination claims”).  Of 
course, protective orders may issue on behalf of entity leaders where an otherwise proper 
deposition is scheduled at a bad place.  See, e.g., Salter, 593 F.2d at 651 (usually deposition 
occurs at entity’s principal place of business). 
150. Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 681-2 (7th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Patterson]. 
151. Crest Infiniti II, LP v. Swinton, 174 P.3d 996, 1003-4 (Okl. 2007) (after reviewing the Texas 
precedent, declining “to adopt a form of the apex doctrine that shifts a burden to the party seeking 
discovery”) [hereinafter Crest Infiniti]. 
152. Crest Infiniti II, 174 P.3d at 1004. 
153. Id. at 1004 (noting the apex officer seeking protection from a deposition failed to identify “the 
more appropriate corporate official to provide the information sought by plaintiffs”). 
154. Id. at 1004 (apex officer did not explain “undue delay, burden or expense”). 
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a general lack of information,155 “objections” to apex officer depositions 
would be sustained in Oklahoma.156 
The Oklahoma court followed a Missouri Supreme Court ruling157 
declining “to adopt an ‘apex’ rule.”158  But there too apex officers could still 
gain protections from depositions by utilizing civil procedure rule 
guidelines on protective orders.159  In Missouri, a “top-level employee” 
with “discoverable information” may obtain protection by showing “good 
cause,”160 which can be that “other methods of discovery” have not been 
pursued161 or that “significant burden, expense, annoyance, and oppression” 
will arise for the entity and its officers where the discoverer’s need for the 
deposition is “slight.”162   
And, the Oklahoma court followed a federal appellate court163 ruling 
that did not adopt the apex doctrine, but that also recognized that apex 
officers could be protected from depositions upon a proper showing.164  
Such a showing by the officers could involve, e.g., lack of personal 
knowledge; the names and availability of other entity personnel with 
personal knowledge; “severe hardship,” given entity duties; or, lack of any 
depositions of other entity officers to date.165 
Finally, it should be noted that the policies underlying the Apex 
Doctrine have been more forcefully pursued by some courts who seemingly 
would characterize the Texas Supreme Court approach as requiring too 
much of a showing of “good cause” (and not too little, as seen, for example, 
by the Oklahoma high court).  Thus, one federal district court observed: 
A corporation, for example, cannot be examined by a director who is 
not shown to be more than the traditional director of an American 
                                                                                                                           
155. Id. at 1004 (agreeing with plaintiffs that apex officers seeking protections must provide “more” 
than “blanket” statements). 
156. Id. at 1004 (“Our opinion does not . . . prevent petitioners [alleged apex officers] from objecting 
to such depositions” in the trial court where the case was sent after the opinion was rendered). 
157. Id. at 1003, citing State ex rel Ford Motor Co. v. Messina, 71 S.W.3d 602 (Mo. 2002) [hereinafter 
Messina]. 
158. Messina, 71 S.W.3d at 607 (“This court declines to adopt an ‘apex’ rule.”) 
159. Id. at 607 (citing Rules 56.01(b)(1) and 56.01(c)). 
160. Id. at 607. 
161. Id. at 607. 
162. Id. at 607. 
163. Crest Infiniti II, 174 P.3d at 1003, citing Thomas v. International Business Machines, 48 F.3d 478 
(10th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Thomas]. 
164. Thomas, 48 F.3d at 483. 
165. Id. at 483.  See also Friedman, 350 F.3d at 65 (on insulating lawyers from depositions, there is no 
automatic immunity); Salter, 593 F.2d at 649 (no deposition of corporate defendant’s president 
until other employees with more firsthand knowledge are deposed); Graves, 419 Fed. App. at 640 
(protective order barring mayor’s deposition as mayor’s affidavits showed he lacked personal 
knowledge); Misc. Docket #1, 197 F.3d at 922 (subpoena to former CEO quashed due to 
particularly serious embarrassment); and Gillam, 952 F.2d at 1152 (protective order to prevent 
deposition of former bank officer who had no relevant information). 




corporation without administrative responsibility or an active part in the 
actual conduct of the business on a day-to-day basis.166 
Another federal district court barred, for the time, a deposition of a 
corporate Vice President who seemingly made a blanket denial of personal 
knowledge and asserted that annoyance would arise from any deposition.  
Later, after other corporate officer depositions, the discovering party could 
again seek the deposition, but only by establishing “the need for further 
examination” of the company by its Vice President.167  Comparably, a New 
York state court has protected a chief executive officer from a deposition 
because the discovering parties “more importantly” failed to establish that 
the officer “actually possessed necessary and relevant information germane 
to their lawsuit.”168 
Apex Doctrine policies often are more forcefully pursued when entity 
leaders are government officials.  As one Florida appellate court noted: 
 
In circumstances such as these, the agency head should not be 
subject to deposition, over objection, unless and until the opposing parties 
have exhausted other discovery and can demonstrate that the agency head 
is uniquely able to provide relevant information which cannot be obtained 
from other sources.  To hold otherwise would . . . subject agency heads to 
being deposed in virtually every rule challenge proceeding, to the 
detriment of the efficient operation of the agency in particular and state 
government as a whole.169 
 
Government leaders differ, e.g., because excessive depositions more 
easily discourage people from becoming public servants than from 
becoming private corporate leaders.170 
Whether for government or private entity leaders, any Illinois judicial 
or legislative adoption of some form of the Apex Doctrine seemingly 
should address norms on initial burdens of proof for those seeking 
protections, on any exhaustion requirement regarding alternative 
                                                                                                                           
166. Armstrong Cork Co. v. Niagra Mohawk Power Corp., 16 F.R.D. 389, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (citing 
Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 13 F.R.D. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)). 
167. M.A. Porazzi Company v. The Mormaclark, 16 F.R.D. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
168. Arendt v. General Electric Company, 704 N.Y.S. 2d 346 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 3d 2000) (also 
noting that discovering parties failed to establish that “the numerous managers already 
deposed...lacked sufficient knowledge”). 
169. Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services v. Broward County, 810 So.2d 1056, 1085 
(Fla. App. 1st 2002). 
170. Citigroup Inc. v. Holtsberg, 915 So.2d 1265, 1270 (Fla. App. 4th 2005).  See also Stagman v. 
Ryan, 176 F.3d 986, 994-5 (7th Cir. 1999) (no deposition of Illinois Attorney General) and 
Moore’s Federal Practice (3d) § 26.105[2][a], at 26-523 to 26-525 (initiating party often must 
show “some extraordinary circumstance or special need”; policy can be that a public official “has 
greater duties and time constraints than other witnesses”). 
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information sources, and on any necessary cost/benefit analysis.  As well, 
any new Apex Doctrine should include mandatory considerations of the 
nature and circumstances of the relevant claims.  For example, the more 
unique or personal the facts underlying the claim, the more likely the 
doctrine should be available to protect apex officials without firsthand 
knowledge.  Personal injury claims involving alleged negligence or other 
conduct occurring but once seem different from personal injury claims 
allegedly arising from systemic problems within the entity, such as patterns 
of discriminatory acts by entity employees.  Similarly, claims arising at 
locales where entity leaders do not work, and have not worked, seem 
different from claims arising at sites where entity readers act and have 
acted.171 
Explicit judicial recognition of the policies underlying the Apex 
Doctrine, via case law, in Illinois (whether explicitly referencing the 
doctrine or not) would certainly fit easily into existing Illinois precedents as 
well as rule and statutory provisions.  As one Illinois appeals court panel 
wisely noted: 
 
The defendant further contends that his right to depose any opposing 
party is unconditionally guaranteed by Supreme Court Rule 202…  We 
cannot agree.  Supreme Court Rule 202 must be viewed with the general 
discovery provisions set forth in Supreme Court Rule 201 . . .  The latter 
rule empowers the courts to deny, limit, condition and regulate discovery 
to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, 
disadvantage or oppression . . .  Thus, trial courts have broad discretionary 
powers to insure fair and orderly trials and can restrict pretrial discovery 
where probative value is lacking.172 
 
The Apex Doctrine addresses simply the sequencing of depositions of 
entity officials, securing fair, orderly, and cost effective civil litigation. 
B.  Limiting and Foreclosing Scheduled Trial and Hearing Testimonies 
In federal civil actions, per FRCP 45 subpoenas “command” witnesses 
to “attend and testify” at a “specified time and place.”173  Anyone 
responsible for such a subpoena “must take reasonable steps to avoid 
imposing undue burden or expense” on the “person subject to the 
                                                                                                                           
171. See, e.g., Patterson, 281 F.3d at 681 (vice present more than 1,000 miles from where plaintiff was 
employed). 
172. People v. Norris, 79 Ill. App. 3d 890, 35 Ill. Dec. 213, 398 N.E.2d 1163, 1172 (Ill. App. 1st 1979). 
173. FRCP 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). 




subpoena.”174  Such “steps” can provide opportunities for prospective 
witnesses to express concerns to those responsible for any later subpoenas 
about potential abuse, including indications by future witnesses of the lack 
of any knowledge about the facts at issue.175   
Should a subpoena issue, a federal case trial witness can obtain an 
order to quash as long as there will be “undue burden or expense.”176  A 
trial witness can also obtain court protection if she is neither a party nor a 
party’s officer and she will “incur substantial expense to travel more than 
100 miles to attend trial” within the state.177   
In some American state courts there are subpoena norms comparable 
to FRCP 45.178  In other states there are different guidelines.  In Arkansas a 
subpoena shall “command each person to whom it is directed to appear and 
give testimony at the time and place therein specified.”179  No reasonable 
steps to avoid undue burden are required.180  Subpoenas may be quashed or 
modified if “unreasonable or oppressive.”181   
In Illinois civil actions, the statute on subpoenas for hearing or trial 
testimony is not very detailed.182  There is no requirement that undue 
burden or expense be avoided.  The statute simply requires witnesses to 
appear when they are served with subpoenas.183  Subpoenas may be 
quashed or modified “for good cause shown.”184  The high court rule adds 
little.  It does recognize that the appearance of “a person who at the time of 
trial . . . or . . . hearing is an officer, director, or employee of a party may be 
                                                                                                                           
174. FRCP 45(c)(1). 
175. Cases on avoiding “undue burden or expense” include Northwestern Memorial Hospital v. 
Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004) (undue burden when sensitive information with limited 
probative value is sought). 
176. FRCP 45(c)(3)(A)(iv). 
177. FRCP 45(c)(3)(B)(iii).  Protection can include not only quashing a subpoena, but also modifying a 
subpoena by specifying conditions for testimony where the witness is quite important (i.e., “undue 
hardship” without the witness’ testimony) and where the witness “will be reasonably 
compensated.” 
178. See, e.g., NevRCP 45(a)(1)(c), (c)(1) and (c)(3)(A)(IV); NCRCP 45(a)(1)b, (c)(1), (c)(3) c and d 
(“unreasonable or oppressive” subpoenas may be challenged); AlaRCP 45(a), (c)(1), (c)(3)(A)(ii) 
and (c)(3)(B)(iii); WVaRCP 45(a)(1)(c), (d)(1), (d)(3)(A)(iv); MissRCP 45(d)(1)(A)(iii) (undue 
burden test, but no duty to take reasonable steps); AzRCP 45(a)(1)(c), (e)(1), (e)(2)(A)(iv), and 
(e)(2)(A)(v) (no 100 mile provision, but allows court limitation when “justice so requires”). 
179. ArkRCP 45(a).  The “testimony” may only involve the production of “tangible things” and thus 
command no appearance.  ArkRCP 45(b). 
180. ArkRCP 45(a). 
181. ArkRCP 45(b)(2)(i).  There are similar guidelines elsewhere.  See, e.g., Massachusetts Rule of 
Civil Procedure 45(a) and (b); ColRCP 45(a); and (b)(1); and Rhode Island District Court Civil 
Rule 45(a) and (b)(1). 
182. 735 ILCS 5/2-1101. 
183. 735 ILCS 5/2-1101. 
184. 735 ILCS 5/2-1101.  Deposition subpoenas may be judicially limited in order “to prevent 
unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or oppression.”  ILLR 201(c).  
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required by serving the party with a notice.”185  It also recognizes that if a 
party or person subpoenaed “is a nonresident of the county, the court may 
order any terms . . . in connection with appearance . . . that are just, 
including payment of . . . reasonable expenses.”186  Compliance failures can 
lead to any “appropriate” sanction permitted by the discovery rule.187 
Witness protections from abuse at trial or hearing in Illinois have been 
recognized, e.g., where subpoenas duces tecum related to information 
beyond that which is always required or where discretionary factors do not 
favor additional information being subject to compulsory process.188  Upon 
a witness’ demonstration of “good cause” to quash a subpoena, the issuing 
party must then show good cause for the subpoena to be followed.189 
IV. SANCTIONING WITNESS ABUSE 
After witness abuse, what sanctions should be available in Illinois 
civil actions to compensate, deter and/or punish?  As the Illinois Supreme 
Court has said: 
Our discovery procedures are meaningless unless a violation entails a 
penalty proportionate to the gravity of the violation.  Discovery for all 
parties will not be effective unless trial courts do not countenance 
violations, and unhesitatingly impose sanctions proportionate to the 
circumstances.190 
Comparably, violations of trial procedures, including witness 
subpoena guidelines, must be addressed “unhesitatingly” so that 
                                                                                                                           
185. ILLR 237(b).  An “officer, director, or employee” under the rule has not included, to date, 
“persons under a party’s control.”  White v. Garlock Sealing Technologices, LLC, 398 Ill. App. 
3d 510, 338 Ill. Dec. 193, 924 N.E.2d 53, 54 (4th Dist. 2010).  When the noticed officer, director, 
or employee is one over whom the circuit court has no personal jurisdiction, sanctions for 
nonappearance only may be levied against the entity party.  Pickering v. Owens-Corning 
Fiberglass Corp., 265 Ill. App. 3d 806, 203 Ill. Dec. 1, 638 N.E.2d 11127, 1136-7 (5th Dist. 1994) 
[hereinafter Pickering].  On who is an employee and who is an independent contract, see In re 
Estate of Hoogerwerf, 2012 WL 342848, 2012 IL App (4th) ___. 
186. ILLR 237(b). 
187. ILLR 237(b). 
188. See, e.g., People v. Brummett, 279 Ill. App. 3d 421, 216 Ill. Dec. 146, 664 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (Ill. 
App. 4th 1996) (applying the limits recognized for discovery in summary driving license 
suspension cases, as found in Teller, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 349, to subpoenas for trial testimony in 
those cases). 
189. See, e.g., Oakview New Lenox School District No. 122 v. Ford Motor Company, 61 Ill. App. 3d 
194, 19 Ill. Dec. 43, 378 N.E.2d 544, 547-8 (3d Dist. 1978). 
190. Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ill.2d 51, 15 Ill. Dec. 852, 374 N.E.2d 460, 467 (1977) [hereinafter 
Buehler].  See also Williams v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 83 Ill.2d 559, 48 Ill. Dec. 221, 416 N.E.2d 
252, 256 (1981) (quoting Buehler’s admonition for all who use discovery “to impede and 
harass”). 




“controversies may be speedily and finally determined according to the 
substantive rights of the parties.”191   
A.  Discovery Sanctions 
In considering proportionate responses to discovery witness abuse, a 
central question emerges:  Should sanctioning for discovery abuse prioritize 
public interests over private interests, as is done, for example, for pleading 
and motion abuses in the federal district courts?192  Public interest sanctions 
benefit society as a whole while private interest sanctions benefit individual 
parties, though both sanctions have certain goals in common, like general 
deterrence.193 
In the federal district courts sanctions for discovery abuses are 
handled differently, and more stringently, than sanctions for pleading and 
motion abuses.  Thus the rule on pleading and motion practice abuse allows 
a 21 day safe harbor period in which to avoid sanctions,194 with the trial 
court unaware of the alleged abuse if it is “withdrawn or appropriately 
corrected.”195  The rule on discovery abuse has no such period,196 though a 
motion for discovery sanctions must be preceded by the discovering party’s 
attempt “in good faith to obtain the . . . discovery without court action.”197   
As well, the federal pleading and motion rule frowns on attorney fee 
                                                                                                                           
191. 735 ILCS 5/1-106. 
192. FRCP 11(c)(4) (only if “warranted for effective deterrence” should a trial court issue an order 
“directing payment to the movant” to cover fees or other litigation expenses).  See also the 
Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 revisions to FRCP 11 which declare that since “the 
purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to compensate the rule provides that, if a 
monetary sanction is imposed, it should ordinarily be paid into court as a penalty.”  Amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 501, 587-588 (1983) [hereinafter 1993 FRCP 
Amendments]. 
193. See, e.g., Wolgast v. Richards, 2012 WL 137810, ___ F. Supp.3d ___ (E.D. Mich. 2012) (1993 
amendment to FRCP11 moved central purpose from compensation via private interest sanction to 
deterrence via public interest sanction [like disciplinary referral or censure or fine]).  Also see 
Wright, Miller, Kane and Marcus, 5A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. §1331 (3d ed.) and Jeffrey A. 
Parness, “The New Method of Regulating Lawyers: Public and Private Interest Sanctions During 
Civil Litigation for Attorney Misconduct,” 47 Louisiana L. Rev. 1305 (1987). 
194. FRCP 11(c)(2).  
195. FRCP 11(c)(2).  The history of the federal rule on sanctioning pleading and motion abuse, as well 
as related state law developments, is reviewed in Erin Schiller and Jeffrey A. Wertkin, Frivolous 
Filings and Vexatious Litigation, 14 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 909 (2001). 
196. FRCP 37(a)(3)(B).  And see FRCP 11(d) (rule, including its safe harbor provision, does not apply 
to “disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions”).  Before 1993, under 
the 1983 amendments to FRCP 11, the FRCP 11 provisions applied to discovery motions but not 
to discovery paper certifications.  Advisory Committee Notes to 1983 revision of FRCP 11. 
197. FRCP 37(a)(5)(i). 
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recoveries.198  The federal discovery rule does not.199  In the federal district 
courts, discovery abuses are deemed more problematic, and more personal, 
to abused parties than are pleading and motion abuses.200  
By contrast, in the Illinois circuit courts there are fewer differences in 
the written laws between sanctions for pleading, motion and discovery 
abuses.201  All civil litigation papers must be certified under the same Rule 
137 standards.202  There is no 21 day safe harbor period for bad pleadings 
and motions,203 as there is not for nonmeritorious discovery.204  And 
discovery sanctions cannot be sought without a good faith attempt to 
resolve objections.205   
Attorney fee recoveries also seem more available, at least 
theoretically, as sanctions for all abuses in Illinois circuit courts than in the 
federal district courts.206  Yet, as a practical matter, to this author feeshifting 
occurs infrequently in Illinois, certainly far less than its occurrences in the 
federal district courts from 1983 to 1993 when the federal pleading and 
motion standards were comparable to the current Illinois rule on certifying 
                                                                                                                           
198. FRCP 11(c)(4) (“an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable 
attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting” from the rule violation is only available if 
“warranted for effective deterrence”).  
199. FRCP 37(d)(3) (sanctions for certain discovery failures “must” include “the reasonable expenses, 
including attorney’s fees, caused” by the failures unless the failures “were substantially justified 
or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust”) and FRCP 37(a)(5) (when a motion 
seeking to compel discovery leads to discovery rule compliance, those whose conduct prompted 
the motion “must” be ordered “to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the 
motion, including attorney’s fees” unless, inter alia, the relevant conduct “was substantially 
justified” or “other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust”). 
200. There has been much more concern by federal rulemakers over the years with intentional 
discovery abuses than with intentional pleading and motion abuses.  Compare, e.g., the original 
FRCP (in 1938) on sanctioning civil litigation misconduct where, until 1983, pleading and motion 
abuses were sanctionable only if willful, while discovery abuses did not need to be willful to be 
sanctionable.  Consider also the switch made in 1993 away from private sanctions for pleading 
and motion abuses (most notably attorney’s fee recoveries), supra note 193, with no such switch 
for discovery abuses, FRCP 37, found in 1993 FRCP Amendments. 
201. Independent of any rule or statute, an Illinois circuit court has broad inherent authority to 
sanction, especially for deliberate and continuing disregard for judicial power.  Santiago v. E.W. 
Bliss Co., 406 Ill. App. 3d 449, 346 Ill. Dec. 717, 941 N.E.2d 275, 284 (Ill. App. 1st 2010) (power 
is “rarely discussed”), citing J.S.A. v. M.H., 224 Ill.2d 182, 196, 309 Ill. Dec. 6, 863 N.E.2d 236 
(2007) (inherent authority is a crucial method for the circuit court to “prevent undue delays in the 
disposition of cases caused by abuses of the litigation process”) and Sander v. Dow Chemical Co., 
166 Ill.2d 48, 67, 209 Ill. Dec. 623, 651 N.E.2d 1071 (1995) (inherent authority to dismiss for 
“deliberate and continuing disregard of court authority). 
202. ILLR 137. 
203. ILLR 137. 
204. ILLR 137. 
205. ILLR 201(K). 
206. Compare FRCP 11 (21 day safe harbor period before any sanction imposed for pleading or motion 
abuse, with attorney fee recoveries a disfavored sanction) to ILLR 137 (sanctions for any 
frivolous paper-including discovery materials—and no preference for public interest sanctions).  




“every pleading, motion and other paper;” from 1983 to 1993 there was in 
the federal district courts a cottage industry in motions for attorney’s fee 
awards as sanctions for civil litigation misconduct.207 
Private interest sanctions include, of course, more than feeshifting.  
For example, evidence-including witnesses—can be excluded from trial if 
improperly withheld in discovery or from other civil litigation papers.  
Exclusion is determined upon consideration of several factors, including the 
surprise to the adverse party; the prejudicial effect that results; the diligence 
of the adverse party; the good faith of the withholding party; and the 
timeliness of the objection by the adverse party.208  Exclusionary sanctions, 
however, often do little for an abused (especially nonparty) witness, who 
would often benefit from cost (including fee) shifting. 
As well, there is the private interest sanction of dismissal.  One Illinois 
appeals court observed: 
 
However, Illinois courts are becoming less tolerant of violations of 
discovery rules, even at the expense of a case being decided on the basis 
of the sanction imposed, rather than on the merits of the litigation.209  
 
Dismissal serves the “interest in promoting the unimpeded flow of 
litigation.”210 Yet here too, as with evidence exclusion, this sanction often 
does little for abused witnesses (often nonparties). 
Public interest sanctions include, e.g., fines payable to the court; 
reprimands of attorneys; and findings of contempt.  As with evidence 
exclusion, involuntary dismissal, and default judgment, these sanctions also 
do little for many abused witnesses.211 
                                                                                                                           
207. Compare ILLR 137 to FRCP11 (1983-1993), found in 1983 FRCP Amendments, at 196-197, 
which was very critically reviewed in, e.g., Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for 
Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 630 (1987) and Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under 
Amended Federal Rule 11—Some “Chilling” Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation 
and Punishment, 74 The Georgetown L.J. 1313 (1986).  The rationales for the 1993 changes to 
FRCP 11 are found in the Advisory Committee Notes, 1993 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 
F.R.D. 401, 583-592 (reduce the number of motions for sanctions regarding pleadings and 
motions, and allow only the rule “specially designed for the discovery process” to guide discovery 
sanctions). 
208. Ashford v. Ziemann, 99 Ill. 2d 353, 76 Ill. Dec. 805, 459 N.E.2d 940, 947-9 (1984) (recognizing 
each case “presents a unique factual situation”). 
209. Atwood v. Warner Electric Brake and Clutch Co., Inc., 239 Ill. App. 3d 81, 90, 179 Ill. Dec. 18, 
605 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. App. 2d 1992) (citing Harris v. Harris, 196 Ill. App. 3d 815, 820, 144 Ill. 
Dec. 113, 555 N.E.2d 10 (Ill. App. 1st 1990)) [hereinafter Atwood]. 
210. Atwood, 239 Ill. App.3d at 90 (again citing Harris, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 820). 
211. See, e.g., Buehler, 374 N.E.2d at 467-8 (recognizing that while contempt is a form of sanction 
available under ILLR 219(c), often it “is hardly a sanction in reality” because frequently the 
“worst penalty is the payment of a nominal fine” which does little to console the opposing party 
who confronted “fractional discovery and fractional disclosure”). 
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Beyond sanctions for violating certification standards applicable to 
discovery (and pleading and motion) papers, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 
219 authorizes sanctions for discovery abuse involving refusals to answer 
deposition questions “without substantial justification.”212  Yet such 
sanctions may only be pursued after private attempts have been made to 
resolve discovery disagreements,213 sometimes described as a “meet and 
confer” requirement.214  Other discovery abuses, including failures to 
comply with the deposition rules, can also prompt Rule 219 sanctions.215 
B.  Trial and Hearing Witness Sanctions 
And what of the sanctions for abusive trial or hearing witness 
subpoenas?  As noted, in the federal district courts those issuing subpoenas 
must “avoid imposing undue burden or expense.”  Similar limits operate in 
some state courts outside of Illinois.  In other state courts, however, a party 
objecting to a trial or hearing subpoena will obtain relief only upon a 
showing of undue burden or expense.216 
In Illinois, civil trial or hearing witnesses are subpoenaed with no 
explicitly required avoidance of undue burden or expense, though the 
witnesses must be thought to have “actual knowledge” and must be 
tendered “payment of the fee and mileage.”217  Witnesses can be asked to 
produce at the trial or hearing “the originals of those documents or tangible 
things previously produced during discovery.”218  Witnesses include those 
persons, who at the time of trial or hearing, were designated in the notice to 
appear as “an officer, director or employee of a party.”219  For witnesses 
with residencies outside the relevant county, the trial court “may order 
appearance” upon “terms and conditions . . . that are just, including 
                                                                                                                           
212. ILLR 219(a) (mandated sanction that “aggrieved party” be paid “reasonable expenses” in 
obtaining compliance, including “reasonable attorney’s fees”). 
213. ILLR 201(K). 
214. Leonard E. Gross, Supreme Court Rule 219:  The Consequences of Refusal to Comply with Rule 
or Orders Relating to Discovery or Pretrial Conferences, 24 Loyola U. Chicago L.J. 471, 495 
(1993). 
215. ILLR 219(c) (varying possible sanctions available). 
216. See, e.g., Texas Civil Procedure Rule 176.7 (avoid “undue burden or expense”); 12 Oklahoma 
Stat. 2004.1 C (“avoid imposing undue burden or expense”); MinnRCP 45.03 (“reasonable steps 
to avoid imposing undue burden or expense”); Kansas Stat. 60-245(c) (“avoiding undue burden or 
expense”); AzRCP 45(c)(5)(B)(iii) (upon objection, protective order protects nonparty and one 
not a party’s officer from “undue burden or expense”); NCRCP 45(c) (duty to avoid undue burden 
or expense on any person subject to a subpoena); and MissRCP 45(d)(1) (subpoena quashed if it 
“subjects a person to undue burden or expense”). 
217. ILLR 237(a). 
218. ILLR 237(b). 
219. ILLR 237(b). 




payment of . . . reasonable expenses.”220  Subpoenas may be quashed via 
court order upon a showing by the person subpoenaed of “good cause.”221  
Witness failures to comply with trial appearance notices can lead to “just” 
sanctions under Rule 237,222 with failures typically read to include 
“unreasonable” acts.223 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Illinois Appellate court has wisely observed:  “The defendant 
further contends that his right to depose any opposing party is 
unconditionally guaranteed by Supreme Court Rule 202 . . .  We cannot 
agree . . . Rule 201 . . . empowers the courts to . . . regulate discovery . . . to 
insure fair and orderly trials and . . . restrict pretrial discovery where 
probative value is lacking.”224  Unfortunately, Rule 201 and judicial 
precedents fail to recognize certain avenues to more just and less expensive 
civil case resolutions.  While multiple new avenues are available, in 
particular in Illinois there should be new judicial rules on prediscovery 
meetings and conferrals in Illinois, as well as new rules on special 
discovery certifications.  There should also be new precedents recognizing 
explicitly the policies underlying the Apex Doctrine.  New express 
recognitions of limits on depositions in rules and precedents would better 
insure “fair and orderly trials” that are not cost prohibitive. 
                                                                                                                           
220. ILLR 237(b). 
221. 735 ILCS 5/2-1101. 
222. ILLR 237(b). 
223. Marchese v. Vincelette, 261 Ill. App. 3d 520, 199 Ill. Dec. 81, 633 N.E.2d 877, 882-3 (1st Dist. 
1994).  See also Pickering, 638 N.E.2d at 1137-40 (entity failure regarding officer testimony at 
trial) and Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Smith, 355 Ill. App. 3d 915, 291 Ill. Dec. 837, 
824 N.E.2d 1087 (1st Dist. 2005) (entity failure regarding employee’s testimony at arbitration 
hearing).  Compare A.G. Edwards, Inc. v. Secretary of State, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1101, 265 Ill. Dec. 
324, 772 N.E.2d 362 (5th Dist. 2002) (administrative subpoena duces tecum quashed for it sought 
salespersons’ private records during a routine audit of a securities and investment services 
company). 
224. People ex rel. Illinois State Dental Soc. v. Norris, 79 Ill.App.3d 890, 35 Ill. Dec. 213, 398 N.E.2d 
1163, 1172 (1st Dist. 1979). 
